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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

Taxpayers confronted by the possibility of additional taxes for past years are
much relieved to find less technical evasiveness in the representatives of the
bureau of internal revenue than was apparent formerly and to encounter a
genuine spirit of coOperation. It was not unusual for taxpayers in the past to
go to Washington prepared to explain the questions raised by the bureau, only
to find an entirely new set of questions propounded by a new representative
who had just taken over their cases and needed information quite different from
that required by the former questioner.
Then there used to be the type of bureau employee who would take no
responsibility but, after hearing the taxpayer, denied all his contentions for no
apparent reason and thus passed the matter to a higher authority. The highly
technical type of bureau employee whose ideas were based on an interpretation
of the printed regulations quite out of harmony with the generally accepted
interpretation was another who formerly made himself felt.
It was quite interesting to note that a great many of them worded their
objections to and denials of the taxpayer’s contentions in the same manner,
somewhat as follows:

“ We have had nothing presented to us that would indicate the commis
sioner’s position to be erroneous and we, therefore, can not grant the relief
desired.”
This formula was given so frequently without deviation that one taxpayer’s
representative ventured to inquire what in the nature of evidence would be
conclusive. He was duly impressed and awe-stricken with the rebuke of the
official person, somewhat as follows: “The commissioner can not prescribe the
evidence that will be convincing—that is up to the taxpayer. ”
Recovering somewhat from his humiliation, the representative drew the
attention of the official person to the fact that the evidence adduced at this
hearing had been presented to the United States board of tax appeals in a case
identical with the one before the conferee and had been considered by the
board sufficient to assist it in reaching a decision. It was a useless gesture,
however, for this particular conferee was not impressed by the board.
The treasury department and the bureau of internal revenue have found that
such obstructive methods do not facilitate the settling of cases, but result only
in prolonging them and congesting every governmental agency having to do
with the adjustment of income taxes. For years these agencies have been
struggling with tax questions that should not have accumulated as they did,
and would not, had there been a little more intelligent cooperation with
taxpayers.
It is different today. When a taxpayer takes up his question with a repre
sentative of the bureau now, in his own locality or in Washington, he soon finds
that he is dealing with one to whom he can frankly and fearlessly present his
point of view. He finds that his opponent is well informed upon the laws and
the regulations and is not afraid to appraise a fact. He feels that his opponent
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can be met on the contention at issue, and that he will not find one who takes a
new position each time a former one proves to be untenable.
An example of the kind of opposition a taxpayer formerly met may be found
in the following actual experience: A taxpayer had deducted an amount of
amortization he had sustained in the year 1918. In 1921, this taxpayer
received a deficiency letter from the commissioner denying, among other things,
the amortization deduction. Complying with the then rules for contending
with the commissioner, the taxpayer had several conferences with the bureau
conferees. Each time a new bureau representative had charge of his case, and
each time there was a new set of conferees. At each hearing it developed that
the commissioner required additional evidence not required at any of the others.
After four or five trips to Washington and meeting with several sets of con
ferees, another conference was held at which an astute conferee discovered that
in the original appeal and protest, the taxpayer had failed to include the re
quired paragraph setting forth that “ the taxpayer did not make the protest and
appeal with the intent of delaying or evading the assessment of the just amount
of additional tax, if any, that should be determined.”
The discussion stopped instantly and the taxpayer was informed that all his
contentions were denied and the taxpayer would be assessed without further
recourse. It mattered not that the taxpayer had shown his original return to
have been justified. It was of no avail to draw the conferees’ attention to the
fact that the points at issue had been considered and fairly well conceded at
former meetings. The taxpayer’s representative went out of that meeting to
the office of a higher authority and soon had his case reinstated. It is interest
ing and indicative of former methods to recall that the persuasive argument
used by this higher authority was that a former letter to the taxpayer written
by the bureau was not in accordance with the regulations governing such
matters. The bureau had used the wrong form letter, in other words, and,
therefore, this taxpayer’s case was saved, not because of its underlying merits,
but because of a silly technicality.
As a result of the new methods it is interesting to learn that the auditing of
tax returns is almost “current,” and that the treasury department’s advisory
committee has set itself to the task of relieving the congestion in the United
States board of tax appeals and of adjusting, as far as possible, tax cases that
would otherwise go to the board.
The board has worked well and indefatigably, but decisions are long delayed
because of congestion. After the board hears a case, the taxpayer frequently
must wait over a year before he is apprised of the board’s decision.
Some years ago it was thought that tax cases would decrease in number. If
there is any decrease of protests and appeals it is not apparent to the bureau of
internal revenue, nor has it been apparent to tax practitioners.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Interest is collectible under section 250 (b) act of 1921, on a late voluntary
payment of additional tax made before the taxpayer’s original and amended
returns were audited. (U. S. district court, S. D., New York, Union Pacific
Railroad Company v. Frank Bowers, collector.)
A corporation holding timber lands was engaged in doing business in the
years of purchase and sale of lands but not in the year when the only business
transactions were the receipt of payments on sale theretofore made and the
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lending of such receipts to its stockholders. (U. S. district court, W. D.,
Washington, S. D.; Monroe Timber Company v. Burns Poe, collector.)
Expenses disallowed by a revenue agent without giving reason for disallow
ance are deductible unless it is affirmatively shown what such expense is.
(U. S. district court, S. D., West Virginia; Bankers Pocahontas Coal Company
v. Albert B. White, collector.)
The value of property transferred in trust in 1915, when the transfer was
intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after the donor’s
death, should not be included in gross estate under sec. 402 (c) act of 1918.
The enactment of the 1918 act did not create any affirmative duty to exercise
or annul rights reserved upon creation of a trust, which otherwise is beyond
the effect of the act. (U. S. district court, S. D., Ohio; Edgar Stark, executor,
v. U. S. A.)
A decedent was held to be a resident of the United States upon evidence of
his announced intention of coming to the United States to become a resident,
supported by his acts and conduct. (U. S. district court, Wyoming; Richard F.
and Barbara Cooper v. Marshall S. Reynolds, collector.)
The statute of limitations applicable to a suit to recover the penal sum of a
bond, which was filed pending action on a claim for abatement of a tax, is that
governing suit upon bonds of such character and not that governing suits for
collection of tax. (U. S. district court, Wyoming; United States v. Onken
Brothers, Inc., and Royal Indemnity Company.)
The creator of a revocable trust, who was also one of the beneficiaries, was
allowed to deduct a loss upon the sale of securities held by the trustees under
the acts of 1918 and 1921, the creator of the trust at all times having retained
control of the securities and directed and controlled their management. (U. S.
district court, Connecticut; Henry Stoddard v. Robert 0. Eaton, collector.)
Mandamus was issued to compel the U. S. board of tax appeals to enter the
findings of fact and decision of a division as that of the board in the case of a
review by the entire board, where the taxpayer was given no opportunity to be
heard and where there was no specific action by the chairman directing that
this particular decision should be reviewed. (Supreme court of the District of
Columbia; U. S. ex rel. James S. McCandless v. U. S. board of tax appeals.)
The purchase price is the amount actually collected where a vendor of
jewelry, sold under a conditional contract, charged off the uncollectible unpaid
portion of certain sales, since in doing so he elected not to retake possession of
the property, in accordance with his option under the sales contract, and the
sale was then completed. (U. S. district court, S. D., California, S. D.; Slavick
Jewelry Company v. John P. Carter, et al.)
The government may recover by suit taxes erroneously refunded and is not
estopped by the judgment in a former suit brought by the government against
the defendant on the theory that it had failed to pay the tax refunded. (U. S.
district court, Minnesota; fourth division; United States v. Standard Spring
Manufacturing Company.)
A return by a corporation in the year of its dissolution showing on its face a
deficit, apparently resulting from the sale of its property in that year because of
an excessive (in view of the facts known to the directors) valuation placed upon
the property by the board of directors as the basis of determining gain or loss,
and carrying a rider that the corporation had dissolved in that year, without
information as to the sale of such assets, was held to be incorrect, misleading
and false. (U. S. district court, S. D., New York; United States v. Thomas F.
Cole, et al.)
Amounts paid by a citizens’ committee as an inducement to a public utility
corporation to erect a cotton compress and warehouse in the community are not
income to the recipient. (B. T. A. Dkt. 4378; Arkansas Compress Company.)
A life tenant is not taxable on gain from the sale of the fee simple, when the
gain accrued to the remainderman. (B. T. A. Dkts. 7963, 7964; Henrietta
Bendheim, et al.)
An account charged off in 1924 by a so-called correcting entry as of the close
of 1920, when its worthlessness was alleged to have been ascertained, was dis
allowed as a bad debt deduction for 1920. (B. T. A. Dkt. 6511; Rochester Last
Works, Inc.)
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Distributions in liquidation of a corporation are taxable as dividends within
the meaning of sec. 201, act of 1921, to the extent of the earnings and profits
accumulated since February 28, 1913, contained therein. (B. T. A. Dkt. 929;
Frank D. Darrow.)
The value of goodwill was disallowed, under sec. 331, act of 1918, in comput
ing invested capital where the stockholders of the transferor corporation
acquired more than 50% of the transferee’s stock, even though such acquisi
tion was necessitated by the regulations imposed during the war by the capital
issues committee, a governmental agency. (B. T. A. Dkt. 7645; Stratton
Grocery Company.)
The right to receive royalties over a given term is depreciable property and a
deduction for exhaustion was allowed to an estate, the income of which arose
from royalty contracts. (B. T. A. Dkts. 8624 and 8625; Executors of Estate of
Phillip M. Reynolds.)
The commissioner is not precluded in view of the evidence from making,
within the limitation period, a determination in respect to the tax liability of a
taxpayer for certain periods considered by his predecessor, who had assessed
additional taxes for such periods, there being no evidence that the true facts and
circumstances, upon which he based his determination were before his pred
ecessor. (B. T. A. Dkt. 5522; Younker Bros., Inc.)
Invested capital for 1919 should not be reduced by a portion of dividends
paid in 1919 claimed to be in excess of available current earnings at the time of
payment. (B. T. A. Dkt. 9494; Nashua and Lowell Railroad Corporation.)
Inventories of a corporation selling women’s ready-to-wear apparel at retail
were approved, where based on retail sale value or cost, whichever was lower,
since there was no replacement market price for most of the merchandise,
reorders could not be made, the method was generally used by the trade and
conformed to the best accounting practice of the trade, and was consistently
used by the taxpayer for all business purposes. (B. T. A. Dkt. 4601; The
Women's Apparel Company and The Weakly Coat and Suit Company.)
A corporation return for the fiscal year 1920 on form 1120 (a) completely
filled in except for the computation of the tax, which was returned to the tax
payer by the collector, started the running of the statute of limitations,
although form 1120 stamped as filed on time was filed later. An assessment
made after five years from the filing of the first return is barred by the statute of
limitations. (B. T. A. Dkt. 11584; Conrad Hardware Company.)
Personal-service classification was granted a corporation engaged in the
photo-engraving business from 1919 to 1921, since photo-engraving is an art
rather than a commodity, the income of the corporation was ascribable pri
marily to the activities of the two chief stockholders, skilled engravers, em
ploying assistants who were skilled engravers; capital invested in materials and
equipment used in rendering service purchased by customers was not a material
income-producing factor, and the corporation was not trading as a principal
within the meaning of the act. (B. T. A. Dkt. 66041; Cocks-Clark Engraving
Company.)
Inventories on basis of cost or market, whichever was lower, from which the
average cash discount allowed by manufacturers was deducted, consistently
followed, were allowed in computing taxable income, the effect being to allow
cash discount as a deduction when the goods are sold and not when payment is
made. (B. T. A. Dkt. 4691; Higgenbotham-Bailey-Logan Company.)
TREASURY DECISIONS
(T. D. 4090, September 21, 1927)
Capital-stock tax—Revenue act of 1924—Decision of court

Corporations—Holding Company—Doing Business.
A corporation, organized to hold for profitable sale the assets of a
deceased person, to invest funds and to liquidate the assets whenever
that could be done advantageously, and which pursues the purposes
for which organized, even though not actively engaged in business in
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the ordinary sense, is subject to the capital-stock tax imposed by sec
tion 700 of the revenue act of 1924.
The following decision of the United States district court, district of Minne
sota, third division, in the case of Conhaim Holding Co., a corporation, v. Levi
M. Willcuts, collector of internal revenue, is published for the information of
internal-revenue officers and others concerned.

United States District Court, District

of

Minnesota, Third Division

(100)
Conhaim Holding Co., a corporation, plaintiff, v. Levi M. Willcuts, collector of
internal revenue, defendant
(August 10, 1927)
This cause came on to be tried before the court on the 14th day of April,
1927, in the city of St. Paul, Minnesota. Benjamin H. Flesher, of Minneapolis,
Minnesota, appeared for the plaintiff, and Leland W. Scott, assistant United
States attorney, and Ralph S. Scott, special assistant United States attorney,
for the defendant.
In December, 1920, the plaintiff, Conhaim Holding Co., was incorporated
under the laws of Minnesota. Its main object was to hold and conserve the
assets belonging to the estate of Louis Conhaim, deceased, to liquidate them
when that could be done advantageously, and to distribute their avails among
the stockholders of the corporation. The estate consisted of stocks, leaseholds,
timberland and life-insurance renewal commissions. The corporation has main
tained an office, but has no employees. It has never dealt in securities. It
has never sold the timberland because no opportunity has arisen to sell it. No
income is received from it. The secretary of the corporation receives a salary
of $100 a year for his services and is an auditor and accountant. The income
of the corporation consists of dividends upon the stocks, renewal commissions
upon life insurance written by Louis Conhaim in his lifetime, and rentals from
the leaseholds. Numerous loans have been made by the corporation to its
stockholders, who—with the exception of a son-in-law and the secretary, who
hold qualifying shares—are the heirs of Louis Conhaim. One loan was made
to the American Security Co. at the request of the son-in-law. The loans were
apparently made for the accommodation and benefit of the stockholders, but
interest was paid and collected. In some cases, the company has loaned its
credit to the stockholders, and in other cases, when in funds, has permitted
them to have the use of funds, paying the current rate of interest therefor. No
distribution of assets or income has been made, and the carrying charges of the
property require most of the income.
The revenue act of 1924, section 700 (a) (1), provides that “every domestic
corporation shall pay annually a special excise tax with respect to carrying on
or doing business, equivalent to $1 for each $1,000 of so much of the fair average
value of its capital stock for the preceding year ending June 30, as is in excess
of $5,000.” The plaintiff paid this excise tax for 1921,1922 and 1923, amount
ing in all to $156, and then decided that it was not doing business within the
meaning of the revenue act, and has brought this suit to recover what it has
paid to the government.
The question is whether the corporation was required to pay the tax.
The powers of the corporation, as enumerated in its articles, are as follows:
... to hold, own, acquire, use, manage, develop, improve, lease, buy, sell,
transfer, convey, deal in, encumber, pledge, mortgage, assign, exchange and
otherwise dispose of any and all kinds of property, real, personal and mixed,
and wheresoever situated, including lands, and any interest therein, chattels,
bonds, stocks and other securities and evidences of indebtedness, whether
corporate or not; loan and borrow money, either with or without security, but
not to engage in a banking business; to purchase or otherwise acquire, hold and
reissue, subject to the provisions of law, the shares of its own capital stock; to
acquire, undertake, carry on and dispose of all or any part of the business,
assets, liabilities and securities of any person, partnership, association or cor
poration, and to become surety or guarantor for the debts and obligations of

457

The Journal of Accountancy
the same, and to do any and all things essential, necessary or convenient or
advisable in the conduct of such business.
It has been held that, in determining whether a corporation is obliged to pay
the tax, the question is what the corporation is doing, and not what it could do.
(United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28, 32.)
In Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co. (242 U. S. 503, 516) the supreme
court said:
“ It is evident, from what this court has said in dealing with the former cases,
that the decision in each instance must depend upon the particular facts before
the court. The fair test to be derived from a consideration of all of them is
between a corporation which has reduced its activities to the owning and hold
ing of property and the distribution of its avails and doing only the acts neces
sary to continue that status, and one which is still active and is maintaining its
organization for the purpose of continued efforts in the pursuit of profit and
gain and such activities as are essential to those purposes.
In the case of Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co. (220 U. S. 107, 171) the court said:
“Business” is a very comprehensive term and embraces everything about
which a person can be employed. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 158, citing People
v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 242, 244.) “That which occupies the
time, attention, and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit.”
(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. I, p. 273.)
In Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate (220 U. S. 187) it was held that a corpora
tion, the sole purpose of which was to hold title to a single parcel of real estate
subject to a long lease and, for the convenience of the stockholders, to receive
and distribute the rentals arising from the lease and proceeds of disposition of
the land, and which had disqualified itself from doing any other business, was
not a corporation doing business within the meaning of the corporation-tax pro
visions of the act of August 5, 1909 (ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11,112), and was not subject
to the tax.
In the case of Nunnally Inv. Co. v. Rose (D. C.), (14 Fed. (2d) 189) it ap
peared that the company, prior to June 30, 1921, had been doing business in a
sense which required it to pay the tax. After that date, it intended to do no
business which would render it liable to the tax. It had no separate office, and
kept its books in the office of another corporation, whose officers were also
officers of the investment company. There were but four stockholders, all be
longing to the same family. The investment company held the proceeds of the
sale of its corporate assets to the Nunnally Co. of Delaware. On July 1, 1921,
the investment company’s property consisted of a large amount of stocks, bonds
and cash. It had loaned some money to employees and to its stockholders for
their accommodation. It collected income on the stocks and bonds held by it,
and declared dividends. The court concluded that it was not doing business
within the meaning of the act.
The Nunnally case seems to be almost identical with this one, since the
making of the one loan to the American Security Co., which was not a stockholder
and apparently not interested in the estate of Louis Conhaim, would scarcely be
enough to distinguish it; but there is in my mind considerable doubt as to the
correctness of that decision.
In Edwards v. Chile Copper Co. (270 U. S. 452, 455) Mr. Justice Holmes said
of the corporation there involved:
It was organized for profit and was doing what it principally was organized
to do in order to realize profit. The cases must be exceptional, when such
activities of such corporations do not amount to doing business in the sense of
the statutes. The exemption ‘‘when not engaged in business’’ ordinarily would
seem pretty nearly equivalent to when not pursuing the ends for which the cor
poration was organized, in the cases where the end is profit.
It is true that the Conhaim Holding Co. was not engaged actively in business,
but its purpose was to hold the assets of the estate until they could be disposed
of advantageously and profitably, and then to distribute the avails. In the
meantime it was to handle the stocks, leaseholds, lands and other assets in
such a way as would be to the best advantage of the corporation and those inter
ested in it and so as to produce the largest amount for ultimate distribution,
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and that is what has been done. No distribution has been made because the
time has not been reached when that can be done profitably.
To my mind, the question is a very close one, and my first impression was that
the company was not subject to the tax and should not have paid it; but I can
not escape the conclusion that the company is something more than a mere
intermediary or agency for the stockholders. They chose the advantages of
corporate organization as the best solution of the problem with which they
were confronted, and the best and most profitable means of disposing of the
assets of Louis Conhaim and their ultimate distribution. Concededly the
corporation was organized to get a better price for these assets than was obtain
able when it was organized, and the stockholders are receiving and will receive
whatever gains may accrue by reason of its corporate activities in connection
with the holding of the property for a better price and the investment of the
funds in the meantime. While it has these assets, it does and must necessarily
do what any other corporation would do which owned such property and was
holding it for sale at a profit.
In Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., supra, it was held that the tax is upon the doing
of business with the advantages which inhere in the peculiarities of corporate
or joint-stock organization of the character described in the act. (See also
McCoach v. Minehill & S. H. R. Co., 228 U. S. 295; Maxwell v. Abrast Realty
Co., 218 Fed. 457; Wilkes-Barre & W. V. Traction Co. v. Davis, 214 Fed. 511;
Cambria Steel Co. v. McCoach, 225 Fed. 278; Lewellyn v. Pittsburgh, etc., R.
Co., 222 Fed. 177; Miller v. Snake River Valley R. Co., 223 Fed. 946; New
York Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Gill, 219 Fed. 184; Waterbury Gas Light Co. v.
Walsh, 228 Fed. 54; State Line & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 228 Fed. 246; Public Service
Ry. Co. v. Herold, 229 Fed. 902.)
Finding the facts to be as hereinbefore stated, I reach the conclusion that the
defendant is entitled to judgment that the plaintiff take nothing herein and that
its complaint be dismissed, and for costs and disbursements as provided by law.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
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